VALUING THE DUTY OF LOYALTY IN A
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
Thomas E. Plank*
In his video presentation on eliminating the duty of loyalty in
limited liability companies,1 Professor Fershée presents a strong case for
allowing members to eliminate the duty of loyalty and proposes guidelines
on the minimum procedural requirements for such elimination. I offer
some additional thoughts on how members may be able to asses the cost
or benefits of such elimination.
Professor Fershée advocates, correctly in my view, that courts,
lawyers, and scholars should treat limited liability companies (LLCs) as a
separate and unique type of legal entity distinct from corporations and
limited partnerships. As a “creature of contract,”2 LLCs offer a wide range
of flexibility in both business operations and governance structures.
Therefore, as noted by Professor Fershée, referring to and applying the
larger body of corporate or limited liability partnership legal concepts to
an LLC is appropriate so long as there is a specific reason to do so.
Professor Fershée then applies these ideas to the questions of
whether and how an LLC may eliminate the duty of loyalty and concludes
that (1) an LLC should be permitted to eliminate the duty of loyalty, (2)
the elimination should be specifically bargained for—that is, there should
be a duty of loyalty unless the LLC operating agreement expressly
eliminates the duty, and (3) all members of the LLC must agree to any
amendment to an existing LLC operating agreement that eliminates the
duty of loyalty unless the LLC operating agreement expressly permits such
elimination by a vote of less than all of the members.

*Joel A. Katz Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law.
A.B. 1968, Princeton University; J.D. 1974, University of Maryland. I have benefitted
both professionally and financially serving as issuer’s counsel, bankruptcy counsel, and
UCC counsel for sales and securitization of mortgage loans and other consumer and
business receivables, first as a partner with Kutak Rock LLP from 1987 to 1994, then as
a part time consultant for law firms, and currently as Of Counsel to Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius LLP. The views expressed in this article are my personal views informed by my
practice experience as well as my research and analysis of the issues and are not the views
of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP.
See Joshua Fershée, An Overt Disclosure Requirement for Eliminating the Duty of Loyalty, 20
TENN. J. BUS. L. 979 (2019).
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Id. at 974; (quoting Kuroda v. SPJS Hldgs., LLC, 971 A.2d 872, 880 (Del. Ch. 2009)).
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Professor Fershée then discusses the value that the elimination of
the duty of loyalty may have to the members of the LLC in permitting
members to pursue other economic opportunities that might otherwise
conflict with the duty of loyalty. This discussion raises the question of
how a potential investor in an LLC can determine the value of retaining
or eliminating the duty of loyalty.
Consistent with Fershée’s views on the great flexibility and variety
presented by the LLC as a form of legal entity, the value of retaining or
eliminating the duty of loyalty will depend on the nature of the business
that the LLC will engage in, and the nature of the structure of the LLC.
For an LLC that will operate like a public corporation and whose
membership interests may be publicly traded, the duty of loyalty may have
significant value. For example, in evaluating the creditworthiness of
corporations (including some insurance companies, financial institutions
and public utilities), the rating agency, Standard and Poor’s Financial
Services LLC,3 has included as a factor the extent to which the board of
directors in a company with entrepreneurial or family-bound ownership
and control of management has “independent members who are capably
engaged in risk oversight on behalf of all stakeholders, including minority
interests” or, if not, whether “it has a proven track record of discharging
its fiduciary responsibilities on behalf of all stakeholders.”4 Standard and
Poor’s further states: “Ownership structure is a governance deficiency if
controlling ownership negatively influences corporate decision-making to
promote the interests of the controlling owners above those of other
stakeholders.”5 These criteria suggest that an express waiver of the duty
of loyalty would adversely affect the credit rating of this type of
enterprise, and would therefore adversely affect the value of the LLC
interests.
On the other hand, if an LLC is formed for the limited purpose
of holding assets and distributing cash flow from the assets, then the
presence or absence of a duty of loyalty may have no importance for the
Standard and Poor’s Financial Services LLC is a nationally recognized statistical rating
organization registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. See 15 U.S.C.A
§ 78o-7 (201X); Order Granting Registration Of Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services As
A Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, Exchange Act Release No. 3456513 (September 24, 2007), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2007/3456513.pdf.
3

See STANDARD AND POOR’S RATING SERVICES, GENERAL CRITERIA: METHODOLOGY:
MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE CREDIT FACTORS FOR CORPORATE ENTITIES AND
INSURERS ¶45 (Nov. 13, 2012, updated as of Sept. 26, 2017).
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members that have an economic interest in the LLC.6 For example, LLCs
are commonly used in securitization and structured finance transactions
as special purpose bankruptcy remote entities whose purpose is to
purchase and hold a large pool of receivables that produce cash flow, such
as automobile loans or leases, other equipment loans or leases, and other
types of consumer and business loans.7 The LLC acquires these
receivables from operating companies that originate or acquire the
receivables. To obtain funds for such acquisition, the LLC will issue debt
securities (a securitization) or borrower funds under a credit agreement (a
structured finance transaction) and in each case will grant a security
interest in the receivables to secure the debt securities or the loan.8
By limiting the activities of the LLC to acquiring the receivables
from the originator or subsequent owner (which will be an operating
company), and issuing debt secured only by the receivables, the debt
holders or lender take only the risk that the receivables will fail to perform
as predicted. They will not assume any of the risks of the operating
Another example of a limited purpose entity that appears not to implicate the presence
or absence of the duty of loyalty are companies whose only significant assets are one or
two noncontrolling equity interests (NCEIs) in other financial and nonfinancial corporate
entities. Standard and Poor’s established ratings criteria for these companies, and the
rating for these entities, depends on the degree to which the companies have sufficient
control over the NCEIs to prevent the diminution of the expected dividends on the
NCEIs. See STANDARD AND POOR’S RATING SERVICES, GENERAL CRITERIA:
METHODOLOGY FOR COMPANIES WITH NONCONTROLLING E QUITY INTERESTS (Jan. 5,
2016) (This criteria does not mention any fiduciary duties as elements of the criteria.).
6

Thomas E. Plank, The Key to Securitization: Isolating the Assets to Be Securitized from the Risk
of An Insolvency Proceeding, in OFFERINGS OF ASSET BACKED SECURITIES § 2.01 at 2-5 to
-11 [hereinafter, Key to Securitization].
7

See generally Reed D. Auerbach & Charles C. Sweet, The Structure of Asset-Backed Securities
and the Federal Regulatory Regime, in OFFERINGS OF ASSET BACKED SECURITIES 1-1 (Reed
D. Auerbach & Charles C. Sweet, eds., 4th ed. 2019) [hereinafter, OFFERINGS OF ASSET
BACKED SECURITIES]; Plank, The Key to Securitization, supra note 7 at 2-5 to -11 [hereinafter,
Key to Securitization]; Jonatthon C. Lipson, Defining Securitization, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1229,
1238-46 (2012); Thomas E. Plank, The Securitization of Aberrant Contract Receivables, 89
CHI.KENT L. REV. 171, 171-73 (2013) [hereinafter, Securitization of Aberrant Contracts];
Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of Security, 25 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1655, 1660-66 (2004) [hereinafter, Security of Securitization]. A securitization and a
structured finance transaction are essentially identical except that a securitization involves
the issuance of securities. The largest category of asset backed securities and loans are
backed by mortgage loans, which are held predominantly in common law trusts or
Delaware statutory trusts. OFFERINGS OF ASSET BACKED SECURITIES at 1-8. For many
years, non-mortgage loan receivables were held primarily by Delaware LLCs but more
recently they have been held either by Delaware LLCs or Delaware statutory trusts.
8

996

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 20

company that originated or sold the receivables. In contract, if (i) the
operating company owned the receivables and granted a security interest
in the pool of receivables, and (ii) the receivables were to generate
sufficient cash flow to repay the secured debt, but (iii) the operating
company got into financial difficulty for reasons unrelated to the
performance of the receivables, then the operating company could file a
petition under the United States Bankruptcy Code to liquidate or
reorganize.9 The commencement of a case under the Bankruptcy Code
would automatically stay any payments on the secured debt of the
operating company and any actions of secured creditors to collect the
debt.10 Accordingly, regardless of the credit quality of the receivables
securing the debt, secured creditors of an operating company bear the
risks and costs of a bankruptcy proceeding by the operating company, and
the creditors recoup these risks and costs by charging a higher interest
rate.11
A bankruptcy remote LLC, however, is limited to owning
receivables and incurring debt secured by the receivables. Accordingly, the
creditors of the LLC with a security interest in the receivables should
become a debtor in bankruptcy only if the receivables themselves were
performing poorly.12 Limiting the risk of bankruptcy allows the LLC to
obtain financing from the debt holders or lender at a lower rate of interest
9

11 U.S.C. § 301.

10

11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6).

See Plank, Key to Securitization, supra note 8, § 2.02[B]; Plank, Securitization of Aberrant
Contracts, supra note 8, at 174; Plank, Security of Securitization, supra note 8, at 1669-1671.
11

An LLC issuing debt in a securitization or structured finance transaction can be isolated
from the risk of the bankruptcy of the operating company that originated or owned the
receivables by (i) acquiring the receivables in a true sale, (ii) not being authorized to incurr
debt owed to other creditors, which could file an involuntary bankruptcy petition against
the LLC or institute foreclosure proceedings that would then give the LLC a legitimate
reason to file a voluntary bankruptcy petition, (iii) covenanting to comply with specific
requirements to ensure that the LLC would operate as a legal entity separate from its
members or their affiliates to prevent the LLC from being consolidated with the
members under the bankruptcy law doctrine of substantive consolidation, and (iv)
authorizing the LLC to file a voluntary bankruptcy petition only with the consent of a
manager that is independent of the members to prevent the members from causing the
LLC to file a voluntary bankruptcy petition for reasons that would only benefit the
members. See Key to Securitization, supra note 8, at 2-24 to -80; Securitization of Aberrant
Contracts, supra note 8, at 181–85; Security of Securitization, supra note 8, at 1671–83; see also
STANDARD & POOR’S RATING SERVICES, LEGAL CRITERIA FOR U.S. STRUCTURED
FINANCE TRANSACTIONS 13-21, 39-41, 39-50 (2006) [hereinafter, STANDARD & POOR’S
LEGAL CRITERIA] (discussing criteria when bankruptcy remote special purpose entity is
an LLC).
12
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than an operating company could obtain. For this reason, securitization
and structure finance provide, indirectly, a source of financing for the
operating companies that originate or purchase receivables at a lower cost
than the operating companies could acquire by issuing securities or
obtaining direct secured credit.13
With one exception, the question of eliminating the duty of loyalty does
not arise for most LLCs used in securitization or structured finance for
several reasons. First, the LLC will typically have only one member, the
operating company that originated or acquired the receivables sold to the
LLC or an affiliate. Second, in some structured finance and securitization
transactions, some or all of the membership interests are sold to multiple
investors. In either case, there is little active management of a bankruptcy
remote LLC, because the primary value of the LLC membership interests
depends on the cash flow of a pool of receivables. The most important
management function of the LLC will be the servicing of receivables,
including collection of receivables that become delinquent. This servicing
function is performed not by the LLC but by a separate servicer with
substantial operational capacity, often the originator or seller of the
receivables. Furthermore, the activities of the servicer (as well as the LLC)
regarding the servicing of the receivables will be subject to important
controls by the debt holders or the lender.
There is one critical feature of a bankruptcy remote LLC,
however, that will implicate the duty of loyalty as it relates to the creditors
of the LLC in a securitization or structured finance transaction. To be a
bankruptcy remote LLC, the LLC must have an independent manager (or
an independent director of a board of managers or directors). The
independent manager must be independent of the member or members
that own the LLC, and the independent manager will not have an
economic interest in the LLC. The role of the independent manager is
limited but crucial: The LLC cannot initiate a voluntary petition in
bankruptcy unless the independent manager, taking into consideration the
interests of the holders of the secured debt of the LLC, consents.14 The
purpose of the independent manager is to prevent opportunistic behavior
by the member or members that could cause the LLC to become a debtor

See Key to Securitization, supra note 8, at 2-15 to -24; Securitization of Aberrant Contracts,
supra note 88, at 175–80 ; Security of Securitization, supra note 8, at 1669–71.
13

14

STANDARD AND POOR’S LEGAL CRITERIA, supra note 12 at 43-44, 48-49 (2006).
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in bankruptcy for reasons unrelated to the performance of the
receivables.15
The preceding examples are merely two of the innumerable types
of businesses transactions or governance structures of an LLC. For any
person thinking of investing in an LLC and trying to determine the value
of an LLC interest, a “facts and circumstances” analysis would be
necessary—an analysis that is perhaps time consuming and indeterminate.
There has been a great deal of discussion about valuing LLC interests and
other forms of less liquid equity interests by various appraisal methods, in
a variety of contexts, and for a variety of purposes, such as gift and estate
taxation,16 litigation by minority interest holders for majority shareholder
oppression,17 or divorce proceedings.18 These methods generally require
the valuation of the LLC or other legal entity, and they may then apply a
discount for a variety of reasons, including primarily for limited
marketability and, in the case of minority interests, for lack of control.19

See Key to Securitization, supra note 7; Securitization of Aberrant Contracts, supra note 8, at
184; Security of Securitization, supra note 8, at 1665–66.
15

A good example of this opportunistic behavior is the case of In re WE Financial Co., No.
92-01861-TUC-LO (Bankr. D. Ariz. filed June 11, 1992), discussed in Plank, Security of
Securitization, supra note 8, at 1665-66. In this case, a bankruptcy remote special purpose
entity, a general partnership, had issued $125 million of high interest rate debt, secured
by Government National Mortgage Association mortgage pass-through certificates were
worth more than the face amount, or par, because of a decline in interest rates since the
date of issuance. The owners of the special purpose entity, who were in financial
difficulty, caused the special purpose entity to file for bankruptcy for the sole purpose of
accelerating the payment of its debt at par by liquidating the underlying collateral for an
amount greater than the par value of the collateral and realizing a profit of about $11
million to be distributed to its owners. Because of the strenuous objection of the trustee
for the debt holders on the grounds that, among other things, the petition was filed in
bad faith, the special purpose entity and its owners settled this case with a reinstatement
of all but a small portion of the issued debt.
See generally, e.g., Jay T. Brandi, Estate Tax Valuation And Comparative Discounting For The
Limited Liability Company Investment Fund, 12 J. LEGAL ECON. 27 (2002); Edwin T. Hood
et al., Valuation of Closely Held Business Interests, 65 UMKC L. REV. 399 (1997).
16

See generally, e.g., Sandra K. Miller, Discounts and Buy Outs in Minority Investor LLC Valuation
Disputes Involving Oppression or Divorce, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 607 (2011); Douglas K. Moll,
Shareholder Oppression and “Fair Value”: Of Discounts, Dates, and Dastardly Deeds in the Close
Corporation, 54 DUKE L.J. 293 (2004).
17

18

See, e.g., Miller, supra note 17.

See, e.g., Hood et al., supra note 16, at 401–02, 407–37 (entire entity); Id. at 437–48 (stock
in a corporation); Id. at 448–52 (equity interests in non-stock entities); Miller, supra note
17, at 611–18 (discussing a variety of discounts and arguing that discounts should not be
applied); Moll, supra note 177, at 315–18 (discussing the application of discounts arising
19
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The valuation methods used for estate planning or litigation
purposes may provide a basis for valuing LLC interests, but the sources
that I have reviewed do not address the extent to which a duty of loyalty
or disclaimer of a duty of loyalty may affect valuation. The variability in
the types of business transactions and structures of LLC perhaps
contributes to what I expect is a dearth of empirical evidence on this
valuation issue.
Nevertheless, an LLC membership interest is property that has
value and that can be transferred, subject to the limitations in the LLC’s
operating agreement and applicable law. An investor in an LLC
membership interest may seek to finance the acquisition of the
membership interest by granting a lender a security interest in the
membership interest. Notwithstanding the costs that the Bankruptcy
Code imposes on secured creditors, a secured creditor in bankruptcy still
fares substantially better than an unsecured creditor of a person that
becomes a debtor in bankruptcy.
Accordingly, a lender willing to lend to an investor in an LLC and
take a security interest in the LLC membership interest would need to
value the LLC interest. Starting with the current valuation methods for
LLC interests, the potential investor and the lender would need to make a
further valuation of the duty of loyalty or the elimination of the duty of
loyalty in the context of the particular business transactions and structure
of the LLC in question. Lenders may have difficulty making a meaningful
valuation of the membership interest, and therefore lenders may not be
willing to do so. Nevertheless, lenders are in the business of lending funds
and often seek ways to expand their lending business. Over time, the
extension of secured credit by lenders to investors in LLC interests, even
if initially at very conservative valuations and loan to value ratios, may
produce enough market information to provide some guidance on when
a duty of loyalty is more valuable or less valuable than no duty, in the
context of a variety of business transactions or LLC structures.
For example, to what extent would the elimination of the duty of
loyalty allow a controlling LLC interest holder to affect adversely the
expected returns on a minority LLC interest? Conversely, to what extent
would such elimination reduce the probability of a minority holder using
from a fair market value analysis and arguing that discounts should not be applied as a
remedy for shareholder oppression).
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opportunistic litigation to extract value by asserting a breach of the duty
of loyalty? Would the elimination of the duty of loyalty provide greater
benefits for certain investors than costs to other investors? Can those
differences in benefits and costs be mediated through the price of the
investment? Because of the great flexibility of LLCs in terms of both
operations and structures, it may take considerable time to gain enough
experience and information to provide better answer to these questions.
However, the very flexibility of LLCs permits adjustments to the
structures of an LLC, including the deliberate elimination of the duty of
loyalty in circumstances that are likely to produce a net benefit for all LLC
members. The flexibility inherent in the LLC as a legal entity will likely
produce greater net social welfare than the a more rigid structure of
corporate law.

